War and/or peace: How the private military and security industry is trying to rebrand itself as a humanitarian actor

As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are winding down, Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are looking to diversify and expand into new markets. They have identified NGOs and international organizations like the UN as a promising new area for their services. In recent years, both the UN and NGOs have increasingly used these companies for logistics and security services. Not only do PMSCs assist these traditional humanitarian organizations in the delivery of aid, they are even ready to entirely replace them, and perform work for a profit that used to be the domain of non-profit groups. For these companies, relief and development work can provide lucrative opportunities.

In a concerted public relations campaign, these companies are repositioning themselves as “humanitarian actors.” This rebranding process is part of a larger effort that includes the creation of “codes of conduct” and “ethical guidelines” for the industry, all aimed at improving these companies' public image.

The private military and security industry is keen to adopt humanitarian imagery and language to win over a skeptical public. The lobby group for PMSCs in the US is called “the International Stability Operations Association” (ISOA), and used to be named the “International Peace Operations Association.” Such feel-good description obscures the fact that many of the ISOA’s members produce military equipment and provide military services that include the operation of weapons systems, intelligence collection and analysis, special operations and interrogation of detainees. Regardless of this background, the ISOA asserts that its members provide “humanitarian aid” and “disaster relief.” This discourse signals a dangerous trend, where the military-security industry is in effect merging with a nascent humanitarian industry.

Take the example of International Relief and Development (IRD), one of the ISOA’s members. The company defines its mission goal in the following terms: “to reduce the suffering of the world’s most vulnerable groups and provide tools and resources needed to increase their self-sufficiency.” IRD is a major implementer of US foreign assistance, and claims that it has “provided over $1.75 billion in humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations around the world” since it was created in 1998. Despite these philanthropic claims, IRD is part of a group that also comprises BAE Systems and L-3 MPRI, two big providers of military equipment and services to the US and UK militaries.

Military and “humanitarian” activities are sometimes combined within the same firm. DynCorp International, a notorious military contractor, has also invested in the development field. DynCorp is one of the US military’s biggest military contractors and is well-known for its controversial role in many conflict areas. In Colombia, DynCorp is officially in charge of the US’ drug eradication program but has allegedly engaged in direct combat with rebel groups. DynCorp was also involved in a sex trafficking and rape scandal in Bosnia in the late 90s, a case that was recently brought to the screen in the movie “The Whistleblower.” In spite of this checkered record, in early 2010 DynCorp entered the aid market by acquiring Casals & Associates, a company which had supported US development programs for two decades. On its website, DynCorp describes the three pillars of its new activities as “justice and governance”, “stabilization and reconstruction” and “humanitarian assistance.” These words could be taken from a description of the UN’s mission. This is not an accident.

PMSCs’ claims to humanitarian ideals not only ring hollow, they also represent a dangerous trend. These companies’ growing interest in the humanitarian sector is adding to an already complicated situation on the ground. In many conflict zones, soldiers and relief workers are difficult to tell apart. In Afghanistan, NATO’s controversial “winning hearts and minds” campaign has made humanitarian action an appendix of military strategy. Some NGOs, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, have denounced this “militarization of humanitarian aid,” arguing that it puts aid workers at risk. As the lines between military aims and humanitarian work blur, employees of aid organizations have increasingly become the target of attacks by insurgents who see them as tools of Western militaries. The problem is particularly acute in Afghanistan, but also exists in other countries, including Somalia and Iraq.

The growing confusion between military action and humanitarian work is worsened when aid is delivered by for-profit organizations, especially if these companies also happen to offer military services to states involved in the conflict. Can a company operate the US’ drone program in Pakistan in the morning and distribute food in Afghanistan in the evening? The takeover of the humanitarian realm by PMSCs seriously threatens two key humanitarian principles, the concepts of independence and impartiality. By blurring the lines between military, political and humanitarian aims, these companies’ interest in the aid sector seriously threatens the reputation and security of traditional nonprofit aid groups.

The use of PMSCs by the UN and NGOs is also a worrying trend. By hiring PMSCs to support their activities, these organizations legitimize companies’ claims to humanitarianism and jeopardize their own legitimacy. Serious scrutiny is needed to hold these organizations to account and ensure that humanitarian aid does not become a for-profit activity used to further political and military goals.

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GPF is currently working on a major report on the use of PMSCs by the UN

Picture credit: treehugger.com

Intervention vs. non-interference in states' internal affairs: Is this really what’s at issue in the Security Council debate on Syria?

The Western media have reacted predictably to the Syria crisis, separating Security Council adversaries as usual into two camps. The “good guys” are seen as champions of a new post-sovereign international order while the “bad guys” defend blood-thirsty dictators in a cynical use of the doctrines of non-interference and national sovereignty.

The media congratulate the US and its European allies for upholding the international community’s right and responsibility to intervene in states’ domestic affairs to “protect civilians” and to get rid of nasty regimes. Russia and China – among other offenders – are framed as backward obstructionists clinging to outdated notions of “sovereignty” while civilians are massacred by the thousands. “Emerging powers” like India and South Africa are chastised for falling prey to the Sino-Russian arguments, for recalling the Western interventions that shaped their own colonial past, and for not wholeheartedly embracing the West’s enthusiasm for its selective version of human rights and democracy.

The media analysis conveys little about the history and the current high stakes politics. The web of great power interests and rivalries largely disappears. We hear little about the control of oil, military bases, clandestine operations, and murky alliances – except, of course, when it comes to the bad guys.

At the UN, the “Permanent 3” (P3) - the US, the UK and France – have consistently framed the issue in these crude terms. In public and in private, the P3 ambassadors have expressed their dismay at Russia and China’s willingness to put ideology before the lives of innocent civilians. After Russia and China vetoed a Security Council resolution on Syria on February 4th, US Ambassador Susan Rice immediately announced that she was “disgusted” by their use of the veto and that "any further blood that flows will be on their hands."

The New York Times, along with most of the media, has echoed this line. Neil MacFarquhar, the NY Times’ bureau chief at the UN, sums up the issue in the following terms:

"Fundamentally, the argument over Syria reflects a deeper divide between those who would use the Security Council to confront nations over how their governments treat civilians, versus those who consider that it has no role whatsoever in settling domestic disputes. Syria is the latest example in an argument that stretches back through all recent conflicts."

Such clichés were abundantly on offer at the time of the Libya intervention too, and they are daily repeated by the press and, unfortunately, by many NGOs as well.

Great powers invoke “sovereignty,” “human rights” and other moral and legal terms to further their own interest and to generate public support. Rarely, if ever, do they take into account the real suffering of the victims of these crises – the ordinary people.

Indeed, the P3’s commitment to a post-sovereign world is blatantly inconsistent. The P3 had no problem in letting Saud Arabia exercise its sovereign right to violently repress demonstrations. Nor did they hesitate to protect the government of Bahrain when popular protests flared there. Throughout the years, they have been unconditionally supportive of Israel’s sovereign “right to defend itself,” irrespective of what this meant for Palestinians.

We should not forget that these advocates of a post-sovereign world are keen to hold on to their own sovereign powers. The United States, first and foremost, rejects inroads on its sovereignty. It refuses to put its troops into a UN peacekeeping mission under the command of a foreign national and it intensely opposes International Criminal Court jurisdiction over its leaders and military chiefs.

The record of Western intervention is not encouraging in terms of protection of civilians and promotion of democracy. Iraq provides one striking case in point. So do Haiti, Afghanistan, Somalia and many others. Before we get enthusiastic about the interventionist approach and succumb to the tempting calls of “something has to be done,” it is well to consider the historical record and to examine the options.

We can well hope that Bashar al-Asad and his regime disappear as quickly as possible and that the Syrian people enjoy democracy in the nearest future. But it will be wise to avoid the cynical, emotion-laden arguments of the Western diplomats and their uncritical media note-takers. Serious thought, not simplistic reactions, will be needed if a durable and democratic future is to be won in Syria.

“Haiti: We Must Kill the Bandits” – Recently Released Documentary Offers Searing Indictment of UN Intervention in Haiti

While the world focuses on the one-year anniversary of the earthquake that devastated Haiti, a recently released documentary is a welcome reminder that Haiti’s history didn’t start in 2010. Haiti: We Must Kill the Bandits offers an uncompromising perspective on the years 2004-2005, when Haiti went through a coup that ousted democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and a subsequent occupation by foreign troops under a UN Security Council mandate. The director, Kevin Pina, a Creole-speaking American journalist who has lived in Haiti on and off for 15 years, tells a story that has so far largely been outshone by the official narrative.

The title of Pina’s documentary is borrowed from General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, the military commander for the UN peacekeeping force in Haiti from 2004 to 2006. Pereira allegedly claimed that “we” – presumably the UN in conjunction with the Haitian police - had to “kill the bandits – but it will have to be only the bandits, not everybody.” He was referring to the armed gangs reportedly operating from the Cité Soleil slum in Port-au-Prince. The thought of an officer in charge of a UN peacekeeping mission describing his mission as “killing” is disturbing enough, but the term “bandit” also has a heavy historical background. During the 1915-1934 US occupation of Haiti, the Marines were already rounding up “bandits,” as all the young men who were fighting against the US military presence were called. “Bandits” became a popular term to label the resistance movement. That the UN should embrace it decades later is disturbing.

Haiti: We Must Kill the Bandits follows what happened in Haiti after President Aristide was ousted by a coup in February 2004. While Aristide was forcibly flown to Africa, the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) – mainly US, Canadian and French troops - was sent to Haiti under a Security Council mandate, supposedly to offer “humanitarian” protection to the population. This intervention brought to power a government led by Gérard Latortue, a former UN official who lived in the US at the time of the coup.

In June 2004, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) took over from the MIF. The mission was headed by General Pereira from Brazil, and staffed mainly with Brazilian soldiers. A US cable from March 2004 released by Wikileaks reveals that Brazil first insisted that it would only participate in a peacekeeping mission sent under Chapter VI, but in the end conceded to a Chapter VII mission (see paragraph 4 of the cable). This is not trivial. While Chapter VI missions are “traditional” peacekeeping missions – they require the agreement of all parties concerned and impose heavy restraints on the use of force by peacekeepers – Chapter VII missions can be defined as “peace enforcement” rather than “peacekeeping.” For a Chapter VII mission to be deployed, the Security Council has to determine that the situation constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. Under Chapter VII, the mandate outlines circumstances in which peacekeepers are permitted to fire their arms, for instance to protect UN personnel or civilians.

The Chapter VII MINUSTAH was mandated, among other things, to “ensure a secure and stable environment” in “support of the Transitional Government” (the Latortue government) and “to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti through the provision inter alia of operational support to the Haitian National Police and the Haitian Coast Guard.” In other words, the Security Council was lending support to a de facto regime with a heavily-armed peacekeeping mission, contributing to the militarization of the situation in Haiti. After watching Pina’s documentary, one is left with the impression that MINUSTAH was sent less to “keep peace” than to perform riot control. “Without the UN, this government would fall in a week,” Pina rightly points out.

The UN peacekeeping force effectively assisted the Latortue government in its efforts to silence supporters of Aristide’s party Lavalas under the guise of fighting the “bandits.” Pina’s documentary presents compelling evidence that activists from Lavalas suffered harsh repression at the hands of both the Haitian police and MINUSTAH. Large Lavalas demonstrations starting from Cité Soleil, a bastion of Aristide supporters, were met with violence by the Haitian police. While the UN officially condemned the killing of demonstrators by the police, a shocking footage from the documentary shows that in one occasion General Pereira refused to intervene even as demonstrators were being shot a few meters away.

Worse still, in July 2005, MINUSTAH led an assault on Cité Soleil against the “bandits.” 22,000 rounds were shot in just seven hours. The footage from the raid’s aftermath is difficult to watch, even though Pina blurred some of the most graphic footage. We see a woman wailing as the body of her dead husband lies on the floor of their house, and a young priest showing the bullet impacts on the walls of his church. A blind man nursing several gunshot wounds sings a tune he composed after the raid to lament the death of his two children.The chorus goes “What have I done to you, MINUSTAH foreigners?”

The voice of these people is rarely heard in the establishment media. When it is mentioned, it is often to dismiss it as “propaganda.” As journalist Isabel MacDonald underlines in her review of the documentary, “Haiti: We Must Kill the Bandits provides a rare account from the other side of the vast racialized class divide that separates the international press from Lavalas’ base of support.” Kevin Pina may show only one side of the story – he acknowledges it at the beginning of the documentary - but it’s a side that remains badly underreported. His documentary is a must-see for anyone trying to go beyond the worn-down clichés the media use to describe the crisis in Haiti.

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We Must Kill the Bandits can be seen here.

More info on the Haiti Information Project (HIP), the alternative media organization which produced the documentary, can be found here.

Ansel Herz, a freelance journalist based in Port-Au-Prince, published on his blog an interesting comparative review of Pina’s documentary and “The Battle for Haiti,” a PBS documentary which “lauds the United Nations peacekeeping mission and the Haitian police for waging a heroic but doomed battle against violent gangs.”


Picture credit: Reuters, 2007